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Institution1. Introduction
As a longstanding American urban phenomenon, residential segre-
gation by race involves both preferential and institutional reasons.
However, scholarship on this subject tends to fragment, eliciting a
quite clear divide between the preference-based versus the
institution-orientated perspectives. For instance, Schelling’s (1971)
classic segregation models1 build entirely upon individual preference
regarding the community level racial composition, with little attention
paid to the local regulatory context. This feature seems to persist in
Schelling’s contemporary counterparts (Card et al., 2008; Chen et al.,
2003; Clark, 1991; Fossett & Waren, 2005; Wang, 2011; Zhang, 2011).
On the other hand, since the seminal work by Massey and Denton
(1993), inquiries about the institutional causes of racial segregation
have mushroomed, primarily relying on more qualitative methods
coupled with in-depth case studies (Squires & Kubrin, 2005; Squires &
O’Connor, 2001).
This paper may be seen as an attempt to move beyond the afore-
mentioned preference-institution divide. Revisiting Schelling’s (1971)
classic spatial proximity model, this study explores the segregationodels. The ﬁrst is a spatial prox-
ation betweenneighbourhoods.
his paper mainly addresses the
. This is an open access article underoutcomes in an artiﬁcial municipality which regulates individual agent
actions for the sake of collective welfare in an ideal Pigou (1920) style,
by explicitly accounting for and adjusting the potential negative exter-
nalities of all private transactions and relocations. In methodological
terms, this piece resonates with earlier works by Webster and Wu
(2001) and Heikkila and Wang (2009), among others, in trying to re-
dress the micro-foundations of bottom-up computational models from
an institutional economics perspective. While the word “institution”,
according to North (1990), can stand both for formal interventions
and informal conventions, its ﬁrst connotation is mainly referred to
hereafter.
The relation between racial residential segregation and local plan-
ning regulation has for long been debated. For example, Nelson,
Sanchez, et al. (2004) studied the data about major US metropolitan
areas in the 1990s, but found no signiﬁcant statistical relations between
segregation measured in dissimilarity index and the adoption of such
planning interventions as restrictive land use zoning, impact fee collec-
tion, and buildingpermit caps. By contrast, another empirical study later
by Rothwell and Massy (2009) identiﬁed ﬁnancially motivated anti-
density zoning as a signiﬁcant factor in excluding, though covertly, eth-
nic minorities fromWhite dominated residential suburbs.
Unlike the previous studies, this paper is intended to address the
above debate from a more generic modelling perspective. Cellular au-
tomaton is employed in this study as a simpliﬁed agent-based simula-
tion approach (Batty, 2009) to revisit Schelling’s (1971) seminal
spatial proximity model, which assumes a gridded urban spatial struc-
ture resembling a checkerboard that contains a ﬁnite number ofthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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cell either accommodating a Black or aWhite family, as in the Schelling
original. A household’s satisfaction, measured in terms of utility, only
depends on the racial composition of its neighbours, who live upon
the nearest surrounding cells. When a household is unsatisﬁed with
the local racial make-up, it seeks to move to another location. In
Schelling (1971) relocation is essentially free insofar as the space allows.
In the presentmodel, however, any relocation imposing a net social cost
upon the whole municipal community is prohibited. This could be
framed as an ideal Pigou (1920) scenario, wherein the externalities of
individual action are perfectly explicit and internalized through inter-
ventions, making the aggregate social cost tantamount to the accounted
private cost; action stops when the cost is too high.
A large number of simulations show that a municipality which gov-
erns individual agents using the Pigovianmode of regulation eventually
tends to generate less aggregate utility, but also becomes less racially
segregated than in the Schelling original. Besides its quite intriguing, al-
beit admittedly modest, policy implications, this study illustrates the
relevance of cellular automaton, as a kind of bottom-up computational
modelling approach, to urban planning research in general and segrega-
tion studies in particular, given the profound spatial as well as institu-
tional complexities therein contained (Batty, 2007).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
reviews Schelling’s (1971) spatial proximity model and points out that
the model can be modiﬁed to account for Pigovian local regulation as
a stylized institutional factor. This is followed by the set up of cellular
automaton in this paper, with the simulation results reported and ana-
lyzed afterwards. The penultimate section discusses the policy and in-
tellectual implications. Conclusions are drawn in the end, along with
suggestions for future research.2. Schelling and Pigou
2.1. Schelling’s spatial proximity model
The phenomenon of residential segregation by race not only draws
urban planners’ attention, but also interests economists. Thomas
Schelling (1971) is one of the ﬁrst mainstream economists who have
looked into the dynamics of segregation. From a game-theoretic per-
spective Schelling modelled segregation in a spatially explicit fashion.
Schelling found that ethnic integrationwould eventually be improbable,
even if individual agents have onlymild racial preference and just avoid
becoming ethnic minority in their local neighbourhoods.
Fig. 1 below illustrates the structure of private racial preference in
Schelling’s spatial proximity model. The two vertical axes in Fig. 1 mea-
sure, by utility (U), the degree of a White and a Black household’s satis-
faction respectively with housing when living in a neighbourhood. TheFig. 1. Private racial preference in Schelling’s spatial proximity model.horizontal x axis shows the percentage of neighbours who are African
Americans.
Schelling assumed that a household, whether Black orWhite, would
dislike becoming racial minority within a neighbourhood and would
want to move away immediately if that happened. Otherwise a house-
hold would stay happily at its current place and remain indifferent to
its neighbours’ ethnic identity. Let U = 0 denote dissatisfaction and
U = 1 stand for satisfaction. Hence the utility function is binary for
both a White and a Black household:
Uw ¼ 1; when; x⩽50%0; when; x > 50%

ð1Þ
Ub ¼ 1; when ;x⩾50%0; when; xb50%

ð2Þ
Eqs. (1) and (2) are represented respectively by two lines in Fig. 1,
one marked with blank and the other with solid diamonds. The dotted
line in Fig. 1 stands for a catastrophic transition in utility from 0 to 1
or vice versa.
Schelling deﬁned neighbourhoods explicitly in spatial terms. He ﬁrst
examined locations on a line, upon which every point has eight
neighbouring points, four on each side. He thenmoved to a two dimen-
sional checkerboard model, in which a neighbourhood is usually made
up of nine cells forming a 3 * 3 square, hence a typical Moore
neighbourhood. This rule however does not apply to neighbourhoods
in the urban periphery, which may contain less than nine cells given
the boundary constraint.
For an illustrative example, in Fig. 2 above, there is a 3 * 3 square con-
tainingninewhite cells, numbered from1 to 9. Cell 9 in the center of this
white square has eight neighbours, including all of the cells surrounding
it. Note that this particular neighbourhood is unique for cell 9. In fact
every cell in Schelling’s checkerboard model perceives its
neighbourhood in reference to the cell’s own location; no cell shares ex-
actly the same neighbourhood with another cell.
Schelling also allowed any discontent households to move freely to
wherever they want, as long as the space is available. It should be
noted that Schelling did presume a certain number of vacancies in the
checkerboard so that an unsatisﬁed household could relocate to one of
the preferred untaken spots and in the mean time leave a new vacancy
available for other unhappy agents.
2.2. The Pigovian interventions
Schelling’s freemoving schemeexempliﬁes a typical institutional ar-
rangement in most standard segregation models. But contrary to what
is emulated in Schelling, a household’s location choice, in reality, is
often affected by the various forms of regulatory planning control. One
primary example is residential zoning. In many afﬂuent suburban com-
munities, the local zoning ordinances often mandate minimum lot size
and single family occupancy (Fischel, 2000, 2004).More price-based in-
terventions include charging a one shot upfront impact fee toward a
new residential development (Ihlanfeldt & Shaughnessy, 2004). Other-
wise if a municipality is managed by a local homeowner association, aFig. 2. An illustration of the neighbourhood in Schelling (1971).
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membership dues (Mckenzie, 1994; Teaford, 1997).
Notwithstanding the diverse forms of planning regulations, econo-
mists consider most of these interventions essentially Pigovian, in the
sense of aiming to internalize the negative externalities that private
deals can cause to the local community as a whole (Fischel, 2000;
Ihlanfeldt & Boehm, 1987). For example, an individual homeowner let-
ting a single family house tomultiple households usually means the en-
tire community is burdenedwith extra demand for local infrastructures
such as water and sewage services. This kind of private party transac-
tion, in economics terms, reduces the utility of thosewho are not direct-
ly involved in and thus external to the deal, often ending up with net
social cost. Anti-density zoning resolves such externality issues by
restricting the supply of land, capping the number of residents per
unit, and essentially raising the price of housing for potential home
buyers and renters. Compared with zoning, collecting an impact fee is
evenmore direct by charging thenewcomers a sumof payment to offset
the negative externalities of immigration. Interventions in the both
cases are Pigovian, in the sense of forcing a concerned individual to be
responsible for the social cost of private transactions.
Certainly, the exercise of any intervention in practice is always con-
tingent upon a variety of political, cultural or even coincidental factors
and thus muchmore complex than described above. Yet notwithstand-
ing the real world complexity, it is both possible and reasonable to in-
corporate a stylized Pigovian intervention into Schelling’s classic
spatial proximity model of racial segregation. Note that the same exter-
nality issue actually also lurks in Schelling’s model. Since every house-
hold cares about the racial make up of its neighbourhood, a
household’s utilitymight be affected adverselywhen the old neighbours
move away and new families come in, which may result in an undesir-
able change in the racial composition of local neighbourhood (Pancs &
Vriend, 2007). If the entire community ends upwith a net loss inwelfare
due to the relocations of a few individual agents, a Pigovian regulatory
intervention becomes justiﬁable, for the same reason that zoning and
impact fees, for instance, are rationalized in practice.
2.3. Toward an integrated modelling approach
To date it remains controversial how the variegated local planning
regulations can affect the pattern of racial residential segregation. The
debate revolves particularly around the effect of zoning on local ethnic
diversity. On one hand critics like Sager (1969) and Seitles (1998)
have ﬁercely charged exclusionary zoning as de facto racial discrimina-
tion in the housing market. Their key claim is that the US housing mar-
ket is imbued with racially discriminatory private preference. Zoning
covertly institutionalizes such private discrimination in the name of
protecting communal interest. On the other hand, researchers like
Fischel (2004) insist that zoning does not directly target race, since
lower income renters and homebuyers of any ethnic background can
be priced out of the market due to such ordinances as density control.
More empirical research also shows divergent results. For example,
Nelson et al. (2004) suggests that there is no signiﬁcant statistical rela-
tions between the degree of segregation and the exercise of planning in-
terventions such as restrictive land use zoning, impact fee collection, or
building permit caps in major US metropolitan areas during the 1990s.
However, Rothwell andMassy (2009) discovered that anti-density zon-
ing and impact fee collections did seem to signiﬁcantly exclude African
Americans fromWhite dominated residential suburbs.
The above controversy can be partly attributed to the gap between
what is modelled and what is happening in reality. Conventional segre-
gationmodels tend to place an overwhelmingweight on private prefer-
ences regarding the community level racial composition, while largely
neglecting the local regulatory context (e.g., Card et al., 2008; Chen,
2003; Clark, 1991; Fossett & Waren, 2005; Wang, 2011; Zhang, 2011).
A more integrated approach would not only look at the individual’s ra-
cial preferences, but also account for the institutional factors that affectagent’s decisions and actions. Recent years have seen a mounting num-
ber of publications in this direction (e.g., Benenson et al., 2009;Grauwin,
Bertin, et al., 2009; Pancs & Vriend, 2007).
A strengthened notion about the interplay between private choices
and public institutions, arguably, also features many contemporary de-
velopments in the general ﬁeld of computational urban spatial model-
ling. For instance, Webster and Wu (2001) used a cellular simulation
to justify localized land use control from a Coasian efﬁciency perspec-
tive. Heikkila and Wang (2009) also deliver an agent-based model of
polycentic urban form and illustrate the implicit yet critical inﬂuence
of social institutions on urban spatial structure. The both works,
amongmany others, demonstrate a renewed appreciation of themicro-
economic foundations of bottom-up computational urban modelling,
aiming perceptively at emulating spontaneous agent actions given cer-
tain types of institutional structures. Bottom-up computational model-
ling deployed in such fashion, according to Batty (2007), has arisen as
an essential approach to understanding and unravelling social and be-
havioural complexities underpinning urban spatial structures. In a sim-
ilar spirit, the next section of this paper presents a cellular automaton as
a simpliﬁed agent-based model (Batty, 2009), whereby an individual
agent’s freedom of action in Schelling’s spatial proximitymodel is regu-
lated and restrained for the sake of collective welfare.
3. A cellular automaton approach
A cellular automaton is coded in Visual Basic after a substantialmod-
iﬁcation and secondary programming based on Teknomo’s (2001) orig-
inal codes. The speciﬁc model setup is detailed below.
3.1. Deﬁning neighbourhood
There is a municipal space which contains N * N cells as land parcels
available for housing. The deﬁnition of neighbourhood mostly follows
the Schelling (1971) original, with one difference. While Schelling al-
lows a certain number of cells to be vacant, in the revised model all
cells are occupied, either by a Black or a White household. This setting
is necessary because the revised model involves a moving-by-
swapping algorithm as detailed below.
3.2. The moving algorithm
Since there is no vacant cell available, a discontent household can
move only by exchanging its current locationwith another cell. Adapted
from Zhang’s (2011), a moving-by-swapping algorithm is employed in
this paper, guided by the principle of Pareto optimization. Speciﬁcally,
imagine two households from a same racial group who could swap
their locations. Yet since the both agents have the same utility function,
a trade would make neither better off; both would remain unhappy. In
contrast a transaction between two racially different households would
at least make neither worse off and possibly increase the total payoffs.
Given Eqs. (1) and (2), Eq. (3) holds for any individual location:
Uw þ Ub ¼ 1⇒ Ub ¼ 1; if ; Uw ¼ 0Uw ¼ 1; if ; Ub ¼ 0

ð3Þ
Eq. (3) has the following intuition: A household will deal with an-
other only if, (a) they are from different racial group, and, (b) one of
the two is unhappy at its present location. In other words, a household
would always end up satisﬁed by dealing with an unhappy household,
insofar as the two households are from different ethnic groups. Note
that this does not necessarily mean the former would have to be better
off, since an agent can be content already before it switches. On the
other hand, a discontent household can never become any further
worse off; swapping location is nevertheless possible (yet not guaran-
teed) tomake the unsatisﬁed happy again. In summary an exchange be-
tween two racially different households must be Pareto improving
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holds from different racial backgroundswould always agree to a deal, as
long as at least one of them is unsatisﬁed with the existing condition.
An implicit assumption underlying this model concerns the vision of
individual agent. An agent is assumed to only see the immediately adja-
cent peers, in the same way as it delineates its own neighbourhood.
However one may also consider a trade between two faraway agents
made up of multiple rounds of local transactions as the two agents
move closer and closer throughout the process of spatial simulation.
Now assume that spatial proximity decides the priority in deal-
making. According to Eqs. (1) and (2), a discontent family must have
more than half of its neighbours from the alternative ethnic group, so
it has to choose which neighbour gets priority. In this model a house-
hold is supposed to start looking from the cell immediately to the left
of it and then move clockwise until it ﬁnds the ﬁrst possible dealmaker
within its neighbourhood. For an illustrative example, a household upon
cell 9 in Fig. 2 would search from cell 1 to 8, following the numerical se-
quence clockwise, until it identiﬁes a suitable neighbour to trade the lo-
cations. Similar rule applies to a household located in the urban
periphery with less than eight neighbours.
3.3. The rule of transition without regulation
As there are only two kinds of households inhabiting the municipal
space, every cell can exhibit only two possible racial states, or formally,
s∈fw;bg, where w denotes White and b stands for Black. Also note that
an unhappy agent can always ﬁnd a racially different neighbour who is
willing to exchange locations. Thus a Markovian transition function for
any single cell may be expressed as the follows:
si;tþ1 ¼ w; if ; U
i;t
b ¼ 0; or; U j;tw ¼ 0
b; if ; Ui;tw ¼ 0; or; U j;tb ¼ 0
(
ð4Þ
si;tþ1 denotes the state of cell i at time t+1,whichdepends on the utility
of a household occupying cell i at time t. Given themoving-by-swapping
algorithm, an unhappy household will always switch with a neighbour
located at cell j from the other racial group. Otherwise a happy family
would simply stay. Another possibility is that a household, whether
happy or not, has to swap its home with a nearby unhappy agent who
is racially different and taking cell j at time t. (A caveat is that cell j’s rel-
ative location to cell i is not ﬁxed in a spatial sense. Instead onemay as-
sume that an agent upon cell j always gets the priority to deal with an
agent upon cell i, as long as there is a deal tomake.) Thiswould also trig-
ger a transition in cell i’s racial state from time t to t+ 1. Finally the so-
journ between t and t+1 is deﬁned as the length of time duringwhich
every cell has to update its ethnic state once as per Eq. (4).
3.4. Pigovian regulation
Regulation in this model targets the aggregate household utility
within themunicipality averaged by the number of households. The fol-
lowing Eq. (5) assesses the average utility, denoted as ψ, at time t across
the municipal space.
ψt ¼
XNN
i¼1
Ui;tsi;t=ðN  NÞ ð5Þ
Instead of maximizing ψt, regulation in this model aims to ensure
that no location swapping would ever diminish ψt. To formalize this
type of regulation, let ξi↔ j;t denote the net social proﬁt or aggregate ef-
ﬁciency gain that a location swap between two households at cell i and
cell j at time t can produce for the entire local municipality. As indicated
in Eq. (6) below,ξi↔ j;t is assumed to bemade up of two parts. One part is
the total private pay-offs for the two households involved in theexchange, denoted as Pi↔ j;t . The other part is, Ei↔ j;t , the externality
this transaction imposes upon the other local households which are
not directly engaged in the deal. Ei↔ j;tb0 implies a negative externality
induced by the private transaction.
ξi↔ j;t ¼ Pi↔ j;t þ Ei↔ j;t ð6Þ
If Pi↔ j;t þ Ei↔ j;tb0, or in other words, ξi↔ j;tb0, the transaction entails
an overall inefﬁciency or a net social cost and will be forbidden under
Pigovian regulation for the sake of infringing collective interest. This
may also be understood as a scenario wherein the two private parties
cannot make sufﬁcient proﬁts to afford a Pigovian impact fee that is
intended to make up for the induced negative externality. Otherwise
the exchange will be endorsed. In this vein, the following relationship
is readily deducible:
ψtþ1 ¼ ψt þ
XN
j¼1
XN
i¼1
ξi↔ j;t=ðN  NÞ; only if ; ξi↔ j;t≥0; ð7Þ
⇒ψtþ1⩾ψt∀t
Eq. (7) says that the regulation tends to improve or, at least, would
never reduce the overall household utility in a municipality. To ensure
that this condition holds, a backtracking algorithm is appliedwhen cod-
ing the model in Visual Basic (Gurari, 1999).
3.5. The rule of transition under regulation
Incorporating Pigovian regulation into themodel requires the rule of
transition aforementioned in Eq. (4) to be accordinglymodiﬁed as illus-
trated in Eq. (8) below:
si;tþ1 ¼ W; if ; U
i;t
b ¼ 0; or; U j;tw ¼ 0; and; ξ
i↔ j;t⩾0
B; if ; Ui;tw ¼ 0; or; U j;tb ¼ 0; and; ξ
i↔ j;t⩾0
(
ð8Þ
Recall that ξi↔ j;t only existswhen there is at least one unhappy agent
either taking cell i or cell j at time t. Otherwise no transaction would
happen between two satisﬁed agents.
3.6. The stopping conditions
Because cellular automaton is a simulation approach, some stopping
conditions need to be speciﬁed in advance. In the case of this model a
key interest lies with the average housing utility, ψt. If the value of ψt re-
mains constant for N iterations, or formally,
ψTþN ¼ ψTþN1 ¼ ⋯ ¼ ψT ð9Þ
then the simulation is assumed to reach a stable endpoint at time T. Oth-
erwise the simulation should also stop after a sufﬁciently large number
of iterations, which equals to the total number of cells involved in the
model:
T ¼ N  N ð10Þ
3.7. The initial segregation pattern
An initial racial residential pattern needs to be placed upon the mu-
nicipal space as a starting point of the simulation. As in the Schelling
original, two types of distribution are generated randomly by computer
as the initial patterns. The ﬁrst involves a random distribution of an
equal number of White and Black households. In the second case
there is no control on the ratio between theWhite and Black population,
as long as the aggregate population equal toN *N. However it should be
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after a simulation has started, would remain ﬁxed until the end of the
simulation.
3.8. Assessing the segregation pattern
Recall Schelling’s key discovery: Segregation would always arise,
even though individual agents only have a very mild racial preference.
Will this discordance between “Micromotives and Macrobehaviours”
(Schelling, 1978) persist in a regulated Schelling model? To answer
this question, one needs to monitor the segregation pattern. For this
purpose an indicator is adapted from Moran’s I to speciﬁcally measure
the overall degree of segregation:2
jIt j ¼
XNN
i¼1
Xn
k¼1
½Xk;t 
XNN
i¼1
Xi;t=ðN  NÞ=½Xi;t 
XNN
i¼1
Xi;t=ðN  NÞ

 ð11Þ
where
Xi;t ¼ 0; if ; s
i;t ¼ w
1; if ; si;t ¼ b

ð12Þ
and cell k is one of cell i’s neighbours, including but not limited to cell j. n
is the total count of neighbours and formost cells, n=8. nmight be less
than eight for cells at the municipal borders.
Given the statistical properties of Moran’s I, the value of It falls in the
range of [−1, 1] (Odland, 1988). In the context of this model, It ¼ 1, if
the entire municipality sees a complete separation between White
and Black households. In another extreme, It ¼ 1, if a household,
wherever it lives within the municipality, always ﬁnds all of its neigh-
bours to be from the other ethnic group. Finally, It ¼ 0, if every house-
hold is located in a racially mixed neighbourhood, with half of the
neighbours beingWhite and the other half being Black. Thus, jIt j, the ab-
solute value of It, has a value range as [0, 1]. A larger value in jIt j indicates
a racially segregated pattern overall, whereas a smaller value suggests
the municipality to be relatively more integrated in racial terms.
4. Results
The model results are presented below in two ways. The ﬁrst in-
volves a case study of sample simulations, by comparing the simulation
outcomes with the initial statuses and monitoring the transition trajec-
tories of ψt and jIt j. The primary goal here is to replicate the classic ﬁnd-
ings by Schelling (1971).
The second way of presentation concentrates on the general differ-
ence that the Pigovian regulatory control can make to the simulation
outcomes. The target measures are still ψt and jIt j. Their values at the
end of 200 simulations, half involving regulation and half not, are com-
pared using paired sample t-test, to see whether there is a signiﬁcant
difference in their population means.
4.1. A case study of simulation results
Fig. 3 below illustrates a sample comparison between two simula-
tions that both start from the same random pattern shown in
Fig. 3(1), whenN=10 and an equal number of Black andWhite house-
holds (i.e., 50 each) are involved in themodel. The simulation involving
no regulatory control stops when t= 29 and ends up with the pattern
shown in Fig. 3(2). Although the average utility has increased from
ψ0 = 0.600 to ψ29= 0.950, the ﬁnal pattern becomes more racially seg-
regated, given the rise from jI0j = 0.055 to jI29j = 0.452. This result2 Themore conventional segregation indices such as thedissimilarity index are not suit-
able in this case, wherein the boundary of neighbourhood is self-referenced (given a cell’s
own location) rather than delineated exogenously as in Massey and Denton (1989), for
example.resonates with Schelling’s classic ﬁnding that segregation would even-
tually dominate notwithstanding individuals’ general indifference to
their neighbours’ racial identities.
Compared with Fig. 3(2) and (3) displays a more racially integrated
residential pattern. The simulation involving regulation stops at t=28,
with ψ28 = 0.900 and |I28| = 0.200. Although the ﬁnal residential pat-
tern is still more segregated than the initial one, the exercise of regula-
tion has prevented further segregation which otherwise would become
the pattern as shown in Fig. 3(2).
Figs. 4 and 5 below compare the trend of ψt and |It| between the two
simulations. The horizontal axes in the both ﬁgures count iterations, t,
while the vertical axes respectively show the value of ψt and |It|. In
Fig. 4 the trend of ψt for the unregulated simulation is marked with
blank squares. For the regulated simulation, themarks are solid squares.
Conceivably the former regulated simulation eventually attains a higher
level of collective utility, thoughwith a bit of ﬂuctuations in the value of
ψt over the course. Yet also notice that ψt has never declined in the sec-
ond simulation but rather kept rising until it stabilizes at the level of
0.900. This ﬁnding seems to conﬁrm the analytical insights carried in
Eq. (7) above, namely that the average utility never declines.
In Fig. 5 the trend of |It| for the unregulated simulation is marked
with blank triangles. For the regulated simulation, the marks are the
solid triangles. Both trends consist of ups and downs, while the trajecto-
ry for the regulated simulation seems a bit more stable and eventually
results in a lower level of segregation.
A large number of trial simulations, including those with a random
number (i.e., not necessarily 50:50) of Blacks and Whites, are also
experimented with. The pattern summarized in the above case study
however seems fairly robust. Almost all of the automations end up
with amore segregated pattern and yet also reaches a higher level of ag-
gregate utility compared with the initial status. This ﬁnding is essential-
ly consistent with that by Schelling some 40 years ago.
Schelling of course did not run a simulation that involves regulatory
control, so he lacked an opportunity to compare the results of regulated
versus unregulated simulations. The above case however suggests that
the two types of simulations may engender very different conse-
quences, whether in terms of utility or in terms of the spatial pattern
of segregation. While the structural differences illustrated in Figs. 4
and 5 above seem to be quite commonplace and almost constantly re-
curring, there is indeed a small number of observations that do not fol-
low suit. Hence an important question arises, that whether or not there
is a generalizable difference in ψt and |It| between the regulated and
non-regulated simulations? The next section addresses this question
using inferential statistics.
4.2. Comparing the general impacts of regulation versus non-regulation
Since the computer randomizes the initial pattern for every simula-
tion and each simulation is an independent data generation procedure,
the simulation results are deployable for some standard inferential sta-
tistical tests. Although, in theory, a sufﬁciently large number of
computerised simulations can exhaust all of the possible model out-
comes, which then can be compared simply using conventional descrip-
tive statistics, the interest here is however in whether one can see a
signiﬁcant difference in a relatively small number (e.g., 100) of simula-
tions. This thus calls for comparing the general impacts of planning reg-
ulation versus no regulation in a more systematic and rigorous fashion
than individual case studies.
To generate data 100 unregulated simulations and 100 regulated au-
tomations are run in a pairwise fashion, ﬁrstly based on some random
initial states involving 50 White and 50 Black agents. The simulation
outcomes are compared using paired samplet-test and the test results
are summarized in the following tables. Tables 1 and 2 below basically
suggest that, in this setting, Pigovian regulation tends to generate a sig-
niﬁcantly lower level of average utility than laissez faire. By contrast,
Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the regulation tends to result in a
Fig. 3. A sample comparison between two simulations, N= 10.
Fig. 4. Comparing the trends of ψt between two simulations.
Fig. 5. Comparing the trends of |It| between two simulations.
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the laissez faire in the Schelling (1971) original.
Almost essentially the same results arise even if the number of
Whites and Blacks are allowed to be uneven at the beginning of the sim-
ulations. However Nmust remain ﬁxed and in this case N= 10 for all
the simulations. Otherwise the simulation results would becomeincomparable. For instance the value of |It| would be systematically
smaller for larger N, according to Fotheringham and Wong’s (1991)
seminal study on the modiﬁable areal unit problem of spatial
autocorrelation.
Tables 5 and 6 are the counterparts of Tables 1 and 2 above, while
the ratio between Whites and Blacks is purely stochastic. Again
Table 5
Comparing the outcome average utility (random Black-White ratio).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome average utility
(ψt)
No 100 .956 .022 .002
Yes 100 .931 .021 .002
Table 6
Difference in the mean of average utility (random Black/White).
Paired differences in outcome average utility (ψt)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.025 .032 7.722 99 .000 .003
Table 7
Comparing the outcome degree of segregation (random Black/White).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome degree of
segregation (|It|)
No 100 .434 .106 .011
Yes 100 .346 .092 .010
Table 8
Difference in the mean degree of segregation (random Black/White).
Paired differences in the outcome degree of segregation (|It|)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.088 .119 7.384 99 .000 .012
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comparedwith no regulation. Similarly Tables 7 and 8 convey essential-
ly the samemessage as Tables 3 and 4. That is, Pigovian regulation tends
to prevent racial segregation which otherwise would be inevitable in a
world devoid of regulatory control.
5. Discussion
5.1. Why regulation results in less segregation?
The outcomes of cellular automata clearly suggest that the exercise
of Pigovian regulation tends to result in a less segregated residential pat-
tern than the laissez faire scenario modelled in the Schelling original.
This can be understood, ﬁrst of all, by recognising that the Pigovian reg-
ulation in this model actually favours the local residents and tends to
discourage moving. In other words, whether the initial pattern is an in-
tegrated or segregated one, the regulation, in effect, tends to preserve
the status quo compared with the free moving mechanism set in the
original Schelling (1971) model; every household simply tends to
have less degree of freedom under regulation.
Secondly, recall that in this paper all of the initial states are random-
ized by the computer. The probability of generating the ﬁrst group of
neighbouring cells which all accommodate same-race households is ac-
tually very small, given Eq. (13) below:
Pr ¼ ðr  1Þ=ðN  N  1Þ  ðr  2Þ=ðN  N  2Þ…  ðr  nÞ=ðN  N
 nÞ ð13Þ
r in Eq. (13) stands for the subtotal populationwithin a particular ra-
cial group, such as Black or White. N * N gives the aggregate municipal
population. n counts the number of neighbours for a household livingTable 4
Difference in the mean degree of segregation (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Paired differences in the outcome degree of segregation (|It|)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.051 .103 4.924 99 .000 .010
Table 3
Comparing the outcome degree of segregation (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome degree of
segregation (|It|)
No 100 .434 .087 .009
Yes 100 .383 .100 .010
Table 2
Difference in the mean of average utility (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Paired differences in outcome average utility (ψt)
Mean Std. Deviation T df Sig. (2-tailed) Std. Error Mean
0.016 .028 5.796 99 .000 .003
Table 1
Comparing the outcome average utility (50 Whites and 50 Blacks).
Regulated? Simulations Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error
Mean
Outcome average utility
(ψt)
No 100 .954 .015 .002
Yes 100 .938 .022 .002upon a speciﬁc cell. Given the deﬁnition of neighbourhood in this
study n= 8 for most cells that are not located at the boarders. Suppose
50 Whites and 50 Blacks upon a 10 * 10 municipal space, as studied
above. In that case, Pr, the probability of utter racial segregation in the
ﬁrst randomly generated neighbourhood is less than 0.003. The proba-
bility for each and every neighborhood to be completely segregated
would actually be even smaller than that. In this vein, it is simply
muchmore likely to start a simulation from a mixed beginning pattern,
which later tends to be preserved by the Pigovian regulation set up in
the model.5.2. Why regulation results in less utility?
By economic theory, a Pigovian intervention should improve efﬁ-
ciency. Yet the Pigovian regulationmodelled in this paper seems to pro-
duce less collective utility than laissez faire. One possible explanation is
associated with Eq. (7) and related to the issue of path dependency
(Arthur, 1994). According to Eq. (7), the average collective utility, ψt,
would never decline in the course of any simulation insofar as there is
regulatory control. However one should note that this is neither a nec-
essary nor sufﬁcient condition to maximize the overall utility at the
end of the simulations. In fact Fig. 4 suggests that a higher level of utility
can be reached eventually without regulation, even though the level of
utility may ﬂuctuate during the course of simulation. This ﬁnding is in-
triguing because it suggests that long run utility gainsmay be locked off
by short term maximization behaviour.
Another, and perhaps even more pertinent, explanation is that the
Pigovian regulation modelled here only deals with negative externali-
ties (i.e., Ei↔ j;tb0 in Eq. (6)) which end up as social cost (i.e., ξi↔ j;tb0)
for the entire municipality. However, there is indeed a possibility that
a privately unproﬁtable (i.e.,Pi↔ j;tb0) relocationmay improve collective
395Y. Wang / Computers, Environment and Urban Systems 54 (2015) 388–396welfare (i.e., ξi↔ j;t > 0), in which case, a subsidybecomes necessary to
compensate for the substantial positive externalities (i.e., Ei↔ j;t > ξi↔ j;t
> 0).What ismissing in the current Pigovian regulation is thus a reward
or incentive scheme that encourages individual transactions and reloca-
tions thatmay seemunviable froma private accounting perspective, but
do yield net social beneﬁts for all. From an economics perspective, this
may explain why the public sector in practice often takes inclusionary
planning measures, such as rent control, affordable housing or inclu-
sionary zoning, to subsidize lower income ethnicminorities andencour-
age them to move into White dominated middle class communities.
5.3. Reconciling preferences and institutions
On top of the admittedly mild policy implications discussed above,
the cellular automata conducted in this study exemplify an integrated
perspective to study preferential as well as institutional factors underly-
ing the phenomenon of racial residential segregation. Many recent in-
quiries have already moved in this direction (e.g., Benenson et al.,
2009; Grauwin et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2004; Pancs & Vriend, 2007;
Rothwell & Massey, 2009). Following suit, this paper employs a
bottom-up computational modelling approach, featuring a large num-
ber of cellular automata of which the programming is guided by some
classic microeconomic principles.
This paper, alongside many other similar efforts in recent years, also
has important implications for the general discipline of urban planning.
In his recent paper entitled “Should planners start playing computer
games”, Devisch (2008) posits that seemingly game-like urban compu-
tational models can enable planners to better understand the complex
process of social and spatial evolution. Compared with the traditional
and more deterministic methods such as regression or input-output
analysis, bottom-up computational models are uniquely sensitive to
myopic agent behaviour, bounded rationality, path dependency, social
and spatial interactions, all of which are particularly relevant to the
practice of urban planning (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Schon, 1983).
6. Conclusion
Employing a cellular automaton approach, this paper revisits
Schelling’s (1971) spatial proximity model of racial segregation. As in
the Schelling original, racial integration appears to be systematically un-
tenable insofar as the agents are allowed to move freely between
neighbourhoods. However, the simulation results also suggest that a
Pigovian regulation to preserve collective welfare may alleviate the de-
gree of eventual segregation, which otherwise would be much more
substantial under the laissez faire emulated in Schelling (1971). Results
from inferential statistical tests conﬁrm the ﬁndings. These discoveries
bear intellectual relations to an important policy question in practice re-
garding the potential racial effects of planning interventions. On top of
that, this paper showcases a bottom-up computational modelling ap-
proach which attempts to reconcile the preference-based and
institution-orientated perspectives in the contemporary segregation
research.
Like many other computational models, the cellular automata pre-
sented in this paper are also faced with potential challenges in terms
of model veriﬁcation and validation (Crooks et al., 2008; Xiang et al.,
2005). “Veriﬁcation is the process of making sure that an implemented
model matches its design. Validation is the process of making sure that
an implemented model matches the real-world.” (Crooks et al., 2008,
p. 419). Given the relatively straightforward model setup in this study,
validation is perhaps amore pressing issue than veriﬁcation. Several im-
provements can be made in that respect.
Firstly, a “parameter variability-sensitive analysis” (Xiang et al.,
2005, p.48) can be conducted by inputting into the model alternative
initial segregation conditions or/and different kinds of racial preference.
In fact, Schelling (1971) did explore a variety of individual preferentialstructures in his tipping model, even though that happened only after
he presented his checkerboardmodel. Given the very fast speed of com-
puterized cellular simulation, a large set of alternative parameters, ei-
ther based on Schelling (1971) or other sources, can be experimented
with in future to test the robustness of simulation results reported in
this study.
Secondly, the cellular automaton model included in this paper is
conceivably hypothetical, partly because of the Schelling original it
builds upon. However, a lot of efforts have been made in recent years
to link the Schelling style spatial process model with large-scale empir-
ical spatio-economic dataset, using such apparatuses as geographic in-
formation systems (GIS) (e.g., Benenson et al., 2009). This offers a
potential opportunity to test, calibrate and even resurrect the assump-
tions of Schelling original in reference to empirical observations. Indeed
an inferential statistical test framework is applied in this paper upon
pseudo data generated by computerized cellular automata. The same
thing can thus be donewith actual demographic data that are becoming
more and more accessible to the general public.
Thirdly, the kind of model studied in this paper is rather stylized in
terms of the setting of agent behaviour. As in the Schelling original,
the deﬁnition of neighbourhood is so homogenous that, even though
every family deﬁnes its own neighbourhood in reference to the house-
hold’s own location, the way of self-mapping is identical for everyone.
However, Coulton et al.’s (2001) empirical study suggests that people
tend to perceive the geography of their neighbourhood in very different
fashions. Such cognitive heterogeneity could possibly be accounted for
by using an online GIS survey platform which allows users to map
their own neighbourhoods.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Eric Heikkila, Philip Viton and Chris Webster for
reviewing several draft versions of this paper. My gratitude also goes
to CEUS editors and two anonymous reviewers for guiding me through
the peer review process. All errors lurking in the paper are mine.
References
Arthur, B. (1994). Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Batty, M. (2007). Cities and complexity: understanding cities with cellular automata, agent-
based models, and fractals. The MIT Press.
Batty, M. (2009). “Urban Modelling”. In Thrift, N., & Kitchin, R. (Eds.), International ency-
clopaedia of human geography (pp. 51–58). Oxford: Elsevier.
Benenson, I. E., et al. (2009). From schelling to spatially explicit modeling of urban ethnic
and economic residential dynamics. Sociological Methods and Research, 37(4),
463–497.
Card, D., et al. (2008). Tipping and the dynamics of segregation. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 123(1), 177–218.
Chen, K., et al. (2003). The emergence of racial segregation in an agent-based model of
residential location: The role of competing preferences. Computational and
Mathematical Organization Theory, 11(4), 333–338.
Clark, W. A. V. (1991). Residential preferences and neighborhood racial segregation: A
test of the schelling segregation model. Demography, 28(1), 1–19.
Coulton, C. J., et al. (2001). Mapping residents’ perception of neighborhood boundaries: A
methodological note. American Journal of Community Psychology, 29(2), 371–383.
Crooks, A., et al. (2008). Key challenges in agent-based modelling for geo-spatial simula-
tion. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 32(6), 417–430.
Devisch, O. (2008). Should planners start playing computer games? Arguments from
Simcity and second life. Planning Theory and Practice, 9(2), 209–226.
Fischel, W. (2000). Zoning and land use regulation. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2,
403–423.
Fischel, W. (2004). An economic history of zoning and a cure for its exclusionary effects.
Urban Studies, 41(2), 317–340.
Fossett, M., & Waren, W. (2005). Overlooked implications of ethnic preferences for resi-
dential segregation in agent-based models. Urban Studies, 42(1), 1893–1917.
Fotheringham, A. S., & Wong, D. W. S. (1991). The modiﬁable areal unit problem in mul-
tivariate statistical analysis. Environment and Planning A, 23(7), 1025–1044.
Grauwin, S., Bertin, E., et al. (2009). Competition between collective and individual dy-
namics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(49), 20622–20626.
Gurari, E. (1999). Backtracking Algorithms CIS 680: Data Structures: Chapter 19:
Backtracking Algorithms [Online]. Ohio State University. bhttp://www.cse.ohio-state.
edu/~gurari/course/cis680/cis680Ch19.html#QQ1-51-128> Accessed 23.03.08.
Heikkila, E., & Wang, Y. (2009). Fujita and ogawa revisited: An agent-based modeling ap-
proach. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 36(4), 741–756.
396 Y. Wang / Computers, Environment and Urban Systems 54 (2015) 388–396Ihlanfeldt, K., & Boehm, T. (1987). Government intervention in the housing market: An
empirical test of the externalities rationale. Journal of Urban Economics, 22(3),
276–290.
Ihlanfeldt, K. R., & Shaughnessy, T. M. (2004). An empirical investigation of the effects of
impact fees on housing and land markets. Regional Science and Urban Economics,
34(6), 639–661.
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1993). Amercian apartheid: Segregation and the making of
the underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mckenzie, E. (1994). Privatopia: Homeowner associasions and the rise of residential private
government. New Haven Co., USA: Yale Univeristy Press.
Nelson, A. C., Sanchez, T.W., et al. (2004). The effect of urban containment andmandatory
housing elements on racial segregation in USMetropolitan Areas, 1990–2000. Journal
of Urban Affairs, 26(3), 339–350.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Odland, J. (1988). Spatial autocorrelation. Beverly Hills, CA, USA: Sage.
Pancs, R., & Vriend, N. J. (2007). Schelling’s spatial proximity model of segregation
revisited. Journal of Public Economics, 91(1–2), 1–24.
Pigou, A. (1920). The economics of welfare. London: Macmillan.
Rittel, H., & Webber, M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences,
4, 155–169.
Rothwell, J., & Massey, D. (2009). The effects of density zoning on racial segregation in US
urban areas. Urban Affairs Review, 44(6), 779–806.
Sager, L. G. (1969). Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary zoning, equal protection, and the in-
digent. Stanford Law Review, 21(4), 767–800.
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamicmodels of segregation. Journal of Mathmatical Sociology, 1,
143–186.Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehaviors. New York, NY, USA: W.W. Nor-
ton & Company.
Schon, D. (1983). The reﬂective practitioner: How professionals think in action. New York,
USA: Basic Books.
Seitles, M. (1998). The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Histor-
ical Discrimination,Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies. Journal of
Land Use and Environmental Laws, 14, 89.
Squires, G. D., & Kubrin, C. E. (2005). Privilged Places: Race, Uneven Development and the
Geography of Opportunity in Urban America. Urban Studies, 24(1), 47–68.
Squires, G. D., & O’Connor, S. (2001). Color andMoney: Politics and Prospects for Community
Reinvestment in Urban America. Albany: NY State University of New York Press.
Teaford, J. C. (1997). Post-Suburbia: Government and Politics in the Edge Cities. Baltimore,
ML: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Teknomo, K. (2001). CAM by Kardi Teknomo. bhttp://www.planetsourcecode.com/vb/
scripts/ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=26432&lngWId=1> Accessed 01.09.05.
Wang, Y. (2011). White Flight in Los Angeles County, 1960–1990: a Model of Fuzzy Tip-
ping. Annals of Regional Science, 47(1), 111–129.
Webster, C., & Wu, F. (2001). Coase, Spatial Pricing and Self-Organizing Cities. Urban
Studies, 38(11), 2037–2054.
Xiang, X., et al. (2005). Veriﬁcation and validation of agent-based scientiﬁc simulation
models. In Proceedings of the 2005 agent-directed simulation symposium.
Zhang, J. (2011). Tipping and Residential Segregation: a Uniﬁed Schelling Model. Journal
of Regional Science, 51(1), 167–193.
